

The Nigerian Military Operation Safe Haven (OPSH) Operation in Internal Security Management in Plateau State: Challenges and Prospects

Dasam Sunday Ibrahim

Department of Political Science and International Relations,
University of Abuja, Nigeria

Corresponding Author: dasamibrahim@yahoo.com

Prof. Mutiullah Olasupo

Department of Political Science and International Relations,
University of Abuja, Nigeria

DOI: 10.56201/jpslr.v9.no1.2023.pg10.24

ABSTRACT

This study investigated the Nigerian Military Operation Safe Haven (OPSH) in the internal security management in Plateau state, Nigeria from 2010 to 2021. Primary data utilised for this study include a structured set of questionnaires and a key informant interview. The sampling technique adopted for the study was the purposive sampling method, hence only those with adequate knowledge of the subject matter were interviewed. Three senatorial zones were purposively selected for detailed investigation and generalisation. These include the South senatorial zone, Central senatorial zone and North senatorial zone. Also, the Headquarters (HQs) OPSH, Sectors and Forward Operation Basaa (FOBs) were selected in each senatorial zone for detailed investigation and these include; Wase FOB, Shendam FOB (South senatorial Zone), Barkin Ladi (Sector 4), Bassa (Sector 3) (North senatorial zone) and Bokkos (sector 5), Mangu (FOB) (Central senatorial zone). 400 copies of structured questionnaires were administered but 395 copies were retrieved and were used for analysis using SPSS. Analysis of data were both quantitative and qualitative. Findings from the study revealed that the State is bedevilled with new dimension of security threats which were not experienced in the past such as banditry, armed robbery, selective killings, kidnappings, farmers-herders clashes and raiding of towns and villages. Findings from the study also revealed that the Nigerian Military OPSH is responsive to the current security threats bedevilling the State. The study also revealed that the Nigerian military OPSH is faced with lots of challenges such as lack of manpower, logistics and modern equipment to ease their operations. The study recommended that the Nigerian Military OPSH should secure modern day equipment in order to withstand the challenges of modern security threats confronting Plateau State.

Keywords: *Insecurity, Military, Internal Security, Operation,*

Introduction

The security experience and realities of many developing countries are often ignored or at most designate to the back burner in the discus of security studies in international relations, downplaying the role these security experiences and realities play on issues like global terrorism, migration crisis, human trafficking, child soldering, money laundering, small arms and light weapon proliferations, violent crime, cyber-crime etc. on the global outlook.

Nigeria has been on the world stage since 1960 and holds a strategic and important place on the continent of Africa and the global community at large, a major diplomatic force and player in the world of politics (Ahmed, 2013; Gambari, 2008). However, Nigeria's security issues have taken several dimensions inimical to the security and continued survival of the Nigerian state as a sovereign nation (Katsina, 2008).

According to Yu (2008:1) the categorization of security issues in international politics places military security issues (MSIs) within the international security theory of traditional security issues. The condition of military security climate in Nigeria thus far seems to be a departure from that matrix of military security categorisation in international politics. This is because external threats from neighbouring countries are never a source of concern to the Nigerian state; its major military threats are internal. Unlike the developed countries where its military security issues are still within the scope of traditional security issues, it is a different case scenario in many third world countries and Nigeria in particular as bulk of its past, existing and emerging

military security issues are internal and they fall within the theoretic spectacle of non-traditional security issues.

The security challenges witnessed in Nigeria especially in the current study area the Plateau so far have proven, from their magnitude, shown conversely that the Nigerian Police and other Para-military establishments cannot tackle them as it is evidential by the huge cost that the Nigerian state have incurred. It is a fact that experiences from developing and under-developed countries shows that stiff competition over issues of power, legitimacy and resource control can threaten internal security and throw the entire nation into a chaotic state e.g. the case of Rwanda, Liberia, Sierra Leon, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Columbia, and many others. Therefore, the need for military participation in internal security operations leave much to be desired.

This move of involving the military into ISOPs however is not without challenges of its own as the military are not known primarily and particularly trained for ISOPs unlike the Civil Security Authorities. As a result, the military consistently engage in acts which are not considered civil in many fronts. Therefore, institutions (like the military) should inject people-oriented programmes and policies in pursuing its goals amd objectives so as to optimize its image and enhance symmetrical understanding (Moses, Akpan, and Presly, 2013).

A cursory examination of the topic evidently indicates that there is no better time to dwell on the security challenges facing today given the internal security challenges confronting Nigeria presently. The rising spate of higher level of aggression against the Nigerian state in the recent times testifies to this. Undoubtedly, defence takes a huge part of Nigeria's budget. This fact is substantiated by some Nigerian academicians (see, Imobighe, 1987; Omede, 2004; Omitoogun, 2003; Dike, 2010 Omede, 2012, Moses and Ngomba, 2017) who all came to the agreement that there has been a systematic rise in the amount allocated to defence from 1960 to recent years.

Therefore, the problem for this study is to expand and deepen the knowledge and understanding of the nature of the Nigerian Military Operation Safe Haven (OPSH) in the Internal Security Management in Plateau State, Nigeria.

Conceptual clarification of Key concepts

Internal Security:

Internal security is defined here as the process of maintaining domestic security of a given state, in this cases the Nigerian state. It is the safety efforts against threatening national security issues.

Internal Security Operations (ISOPs):

Internal security operations (ISOPs) in this study is defined as any designed activities to contain internal threats as an effort to preserve law and order in a state and are executed by internal security agents e.g. the police force, immigration service, customs service, Department of state security service and other domestic security apparatus.

Military:

Military here is seen as a strategic defence instrument used against internal or external threats to national security by the state, in other words the armed forces of a country.

Security:

Security refers to efforts or measures constructed to ensure safety against threatening security challenges. The agenda of security here is with regards to military security issues through the involvement in internal security operations.

Study Area and Research Methods

Plateau state derives its name from the dominant landscape in the area, “The Plateau” or rather “Jos Plateau” located in the middle belt zone, the State lies between latitudes 80 degrees 24’N and longitude 80 degrees 32 and 100 degrees 38 East. It covers vast and mixed topography of captivating rock formations and a land mass of about 26,899 square kilometres with a projected total population of four million, two hundred and eighty-three thousand, seven hundred and four (1991 Census Provisional Figures). The State is ethnically and religiously diverse with well over 50 officially listed ethnic groups and diverse forms of religious plurality (Plateau State Peace Conference, 2004). The State is bounded by Bauchi, Nasarawa, Kaduna, Gombe and Taraba states. The heights of these plateau are on the average of 1,200 metres (about 4000 feet) above sea level like the famous Shere Hills. Plateau state’s climatic conditions are akin to those of temperate regions with mean temperatures of 18,71oF minimum.

The State is broadly divided into three senatorial zones (Southern, Central and Northern senatorial zones) which crystallize in a manner that often defines the politics, culture and languages of the people in the State. The state is governed by the elected governor supported by the commissioners appointed by the Governor. The 17 local government area councils Bassa, Jos East, Barkin Ladi, Jos North, Jos South, Riyom, Bokkos, Mangu, Kanke, Pankshin, Mikang, Kanam, Langtang North, Langtang South, Quan’an-pan, Shendam and Wase are administered by elected chairmen and supported by the traditional rulers.



Figure 1.1 Political Map of Plateau State

Source: Memorandum for the Creation of South Plateau State.

Research Method

Sample Frame

The sampling frame for this study constituted personnel of the Nigerian Police, Operation Safe Haven headquarters, Sectors and Forward Operation Bases commanders and men of OPSH in Plateau state, Plateau state government officials, Plateau Peace Building Agency, Plateau state Operation Rainbow, NGOs like Stefanos Foundation, traditional rulers, Miyeti Allah, community leaders and youth leaders of the Study area.

Population of the Study

The population of the Study comprises of the following personnel; 264 HQ OPSH, 210 Sector 3 Bassa and 179 Sector 4 Barkin Ladi, 71 FOB Mangu and 142 Sector 5 Bokkos. Also 155 FOB Wase and 120 FOB Shendam. This translates to 1,141 of OPSH personnel who were considered as potential respondents to the Study. This is lucidly shown in table 1.1 below;

Table 1.1 BREAKDOWN OF A FINITE POPULATION OF PERSONNEL IN OPSH IN PLATEAU STATE AS AT AUGUST 2021

Serial	Sect/FOB	NA	NN	NAF	Total
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(m)
1.	HQ OPSH	171	15	20	264
2.	Sector 1 (Jos North/Jos East)	41	20	4	147
3.	Sector 3 (Bassa)	129	29	16	210
4.	Sector 4 (Barkin Ladi)	116	8	14	179
5.	Sector 5 (Bokkos)	71	5	16	142
6.	Sector 6 (Riyom/ Jos south)	95	14	10	167
7.	Sector 7	134	23	15	227
8.	FOB Gashish	39	10	6	72
9.	FOB Gyambwas	23	4		74
10.	FOB Hukke	28	5	4	47
11.	FOB Mangu	23	6	7	71
12.	FOB Sanga	43	11	2	110
13.	FOB Shendam	77	9	12	120
14.	FOB T/Balewa	15	5	3	47
15.	FOB Wase	104	9	6	155
16.	FOB Lamingo	10	2	4	23
17.	OPSH SF	17	4		21
	G/TOTAL	1136	179	139	2076

Source: Headquarters OPSH Plateau State, August 2021

Sample Size and Sampling Techniques

Taro Yamane Formula was used to calculate the sample size for the study. Using a defined population of OPSH personnel in the area considered for the Study, a confidence level of 95 percent and error margin of 5 percent, the sample size was calculated, the formula is presented below. The study adopted non-probabilistic purposive sampling technique and simple random sampling technique to target stakeholders and individuals that were involved in the Study. The non-probabilistic purposive sampling technique allowed for opinions of experts in the field of study. The non-probabilistic purposive sampling technique enabled the study to select the sectors, Forward Operation Bases and stakeholders in the senatorial zones for sampling. The non-probabilistic purposive sampling technique has its limitation of selection bias as a result of non-randomization. The limitation was however mitigated by using the simple random sampling technique to select some people living within the space boundary of the study to get public opinions on the OPSH in internal security management in Plateau state. Also, the key informant Interview method was employed to seek the opinion of commanders, traditional rulers, youth leaders and community leaders in the State so as to have an in-depth understanding on the current insecurity threats bedeviling the State and also to explore their perceptions on the OPSH internal security management in Plateau state.

The HQ OPSH, sectors and FOB's selected for detailed investigation in each senatorial district are presented in table 1.2.

Table 1.2: Sampled Sectors/FOB's

South Senatorial Zone	North Senatorial Zone	Central Senatorial Zone
Wase (FOB)	Barkin Ladi (Sector 4)	Bokkos (Sector 5)
Shendam (FOB)	Bassa (Sector 3)	Mangu (FOB)

The population were distributed in proportion to the HQs OPSH, sectors and FOBs chosen for detailed investigation. This is presented in table 1.3.

Table 1.3: Distribution in the HQ OPSH and in each Sectors and FOB's in the Senatorial Zones

S/N	Locations	Population	Sample Size
1	HQ OPSH	264	93
2	South Senatorial Zone		
	Wase (FOB)	155	54
	Shendam (FOB)	120	42
3	North Senatorial Zone		
	Barkin Ladi (Sector 4)	179	63
	Bassa (Sector 3)	210	74
4	Central Senatorial Zone		
	Bokkos (Sector 5)	142	49
	Mangu (FOB)	71	25
4	Total	1,141	400

Sample Size Calculation: The Taro Yamani Formula was employed to determine the sample size. This is designated by the formula:

N

$$n = \frac{N}{1 + N(e)^2}$$

Where n = the sample size =

N = Total Population size

1 = Constant

e = Error limit (5% error margin and 95% level of confidence) = 0.05

= 1,141

$$\frac{1,141}{1 + 1,141 (0.05)^2} = \frac{1,141}{1 + 1,141 (0.0025)}$$

= 1,141

$$\frac{1,141}{1 + 2, 8525} = 1,141$$

$$2.855 = 399.6 = \text{Approx. } 400$$

$$n = 400$$

Hence, Purposive sampling was used to administer four hundred questionnaires to the OPSH officers as highlighted in the table above. Also, the questionnaire used for data collection were coded in SPSS version 20.1 to ease analysis.

Source: Researchers Sample Size Calculation, August 2021.

Validation and Reliability of the Instruments

According to Fowler (2002), a defining property of social survey is that answers to questions are used as a measure which a critical dimension of the quality of survey estimates is. This critical dimension depends upon reliability (i.e. providing consistent measures in comparable situations) and validity (i.e. answers corresponding to what they intend to measure) of questions asked to survey respondents. Therefore, both the issue of reliability and validity of the research instrument are of utmost importance for this study. To test the internal consistency of measures, a reliability test was performed. The Cronbach's alpha was computed for all the constructs. The constructs to assess the nature of the Nigerian military OPSH had a value of 0.72 which indicates that the instrument is reliable.

Method of Data Analysis and Presentation

The data collected for the study was analysed both quantitatively and qualitatively. Firstly, data from structured interview and some secondary data were analysed qualitatively using logical reasoning based on facts. Secondly, data obtained through questionnaire was prepared and treated before being analysed quantitatively using descriptive statistical tools the SPSS 20.1. The data presented in a descriptive form using statistical tables.

Discussion of results

SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF RESPONDENTS

Table 1.4 shows that 4.4%, 5.8%, 16.7%, 11.3%, 8.1%, 16.3% and 12.0% of the respondents in HQ OPSH, Wase (FOB), Shendam(FOB), Barkin Ladi (Sector 4), Bassa (Sector 3), Bokkos (Sector 5) and Mangu (FOB) are less than 20years of Age, in the same vein 20.9%, 30.8%, 28.6%, 29.0%, 28.4%, 20.4% and 16.0% of the respondents in HQ OPSH, Wase (FOB), Shendam (FOB), Barkin Ladi (Sector 4), Bassa (Sector 3), Bokkos (Sector 5) and Mangu (FOB) are within the age range of 20-29years of age, also the table revealed that a great majority of the respondents are within the age range of 30-39years which comprises of 47.3%, 44.2%, 33.3%, 33.9%, 39.2%, 40.8% and 40.0% of the respondents in HQ OPSH, Wase(FOB), Shendam(FOB), Barkin Ladi (Sector 4), Bassa (Sector 3), Bokkos (Sector 5) and Mangu (FOB) respectively, the table further shows that 11.0%, 7.7%, 21.4%, 14.5%, 16.2%, 16.3% and 24.0% of the respondents in HQ OPSH, Wase (FOB), Shendam (FOB), Barkin Ladi (Sector 4), Bassa (Sector 3), Bokkos (Sector 5) and Mangu (FOB) are all within the age range of 40-49years, while 16.5%, 11.5%, 11.3%, 8.1%, 6.1% and 8.0% of the respondents in HQ OPSH, Wase(FOB), Barkin Ladi (Sector 4), Bassa (Sector 3), Bokkos (Sector 5) and Mangu (FOB) are within the age range of 50 and above respectively.

The table also shows that 90.1%, 92.3%, 85.7%, 75.8%, 91.9%, 91.8% and 76.0% of the respondents in HQ OPSH, Wase(FOB), Barkin Ladi (Sector 4), Bassa (Sector 3), Bokkos (Sector 5) and Mangu (FOB) are all males, while only 9.9%, 7.7%, 14.3%, 24.2%, 8.1%, 8.2% and 24.0% of the respondents in HQ OPSH, Wase(FOB), Barkin Ladi (Sector 4), Bassa (Sector 3), Bokkos (Sector 5) and Mangu (FOB) are all females respectively. This finding is not unconnected to the fact that men have historically occupied military roles and responsibilities. Although women are no less qualified to occupy military positions, female military personnel are significantly fewer in number than male military personnel as a result

of historical policies, social impediments, and a culture that has resisted the integration of women into its ranks. In a military environment, the dominant male population has served to empower male cultural norms that attempt to exclude women to maintain the current gender order (King, 2016). According to Emmanuel Reynaud, writing on the social construction of masculinity, women are philosophically irrational and fragile, and they are historically not considered or viewed as being capable of coping with male standards, nor are they supposed to know how to think logically (Reynaud, 2004).

Table 1.4 further revealed that a great majority of the respondents are married which comprises of 68.1%, 59.6%, 47.6%, 54.8%, 54.1%, 57.1% and 68.0% of the respondents in HQ OPSH, Wase (FOB), Barkin Ladi (Sector 4), Bassa (Sector 3), Bokkos (Sector 5) and Mangu (FOB) respectively, while only 13.2%, 23.1%, 31.0%, 14.5%, 27.0%, 26.5% and 12.0% of the respondents in HQ OPSH, Wase(FOB), Barkin Ladi (Sector 4), Bassa (Sector 3), Bokkos (Sector 5) and Mangu (FOB) are single, in the same vein 18.7%, 17.3%, 21.4%, 30.6%, 18.9%, 16.3% and 20.0% of the respondents in HQ OPSH, Wase (FOB), Barkin Ladi (Sector 4), Bassa (Sector 3), Bokkos (Sector 5) and Mangu (FOB) accounted for others such as Divorce, Widow/widower respectively. The table further shows that no respondent in the present study area has a PhD Qualification, while only 4.4% (HQ OPSH) and 1.4% (Bassa) of the respondents have had a masters qualification, in the same vein 28.6% (HQ OPSH), 15.4% (Wase FOB), 4.8% (Barkin Ladi sector 3), 2.7% (Bassa sector 3), 6.1% (Bokkos sector 5) and 4.0% (Mangu FOB) of the respondents has acquired a Post Graduate Diploma Degree, also 28.6%, 26.9%, 11.9%, 19.4%, 18.9%, 8.2% and 28.0% of the respondents in HQ OPSH, Wase(FOB), Barkin Ladi (Sector 4), Bassa (Sector 3), Bokkos (Sector 5) and Mangu (FOB) have acquired a Bachelor's degree, in the same vein 16.5%, 21.2%, 31.0%, 24.2%, 16.2%, 20.4% and 40.0% of the respondents in HQ OPSH, Wase(FOB), Barkin Ladi (Sector 4), Bassa (Sector 3), Bokkos (Sector 5) and Mangu (FOB) have gotten a Higher National Diploma Degree, also 13.2%, 19.2%, 31.0%, 25.8%, 31.1%, 22.4% and 12.0% of the respondents in HQ OPSH, Wase(FOB), Barkin Ladi (Sector 4), Bassa (Sector 3), Bokkos (Sector 5) and Mangu (FOB) have gotten Ordinary National Diploma qualification, while only 8.8%, 17.3%, 26.2%, 25.8%, 29.7%, 42.9% and 16.0% of the respondents in HQ OPSH, Wase(FOB), Barkin Ladi (Sector 4), Bassa (Sector 3), Bokkos (Sector 5) and Mangu (FOB) have Secondary school leaving certificate as their highest form of qualification. The table further revealed that the majority of the officers are from the North-central part of the country which comprises of 34.1%, 19.2%, 21.4%, 38.7%, 24.3%, 24.5% and 32.0% of the respondents in HQ OPSH, Wase(FOB), Barkin Ladi (Sector 4), Bassa (Sector 3), Bokkos (Sector 5) and Mangu (FOB) respectively, this is closely followed by Officers from the North-western part of the country comprising of 20.9%, 23.1%, 11.9%, 27.4%, 27.0%, 32.7% and 16.0% of the respondents in HQ OPSH, Wase(FOB), Barkin Ladi (Sector 4), Bassa (Sector 3), Bokkos (Sector 5) and Mangu (FOB) respectively.

Table 1.4 SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF RESPONDENTS

Age	HQ OPSH		Wase(FO B)		Shendam(FO B)		Barkin Ladi (Sector 4)		Bassa (Sector 3)		Bokkos (Sector 5)		Mangu (FOB)	
	Fre q	%	Fre q	%	Freq	%	Fre q	%	Fre q	%	Fre q	%	Fre q	%
<20years	4	4.4	3	5.8	7	16.7	7	11.3	6	8.1	8	16.3	3	12.0
20-29years	19	20.9	16	30.8	12	28.6	18	29.0	21	28.4	10	20.4	4	16.0
30-39years	43	47.3	23	44.2	14	33.3	21	33.9	29	39.2	20	40.8	10	40.0
40-49years	10	11.0	4	7.7	9	21.4	9	14.5	12	16.2	8	16.3	6	24.0
50-Above	15	16.5	6	11.5	-	-	7	11.3	6	8.1	3	6.1	2	8.0
Total	91	100.0	52	100.0	42	100.0	62	100.0	74	100.0	49	100.0	25	100.0
Sex	HQ OPSH		Wase(FO B)		Shendam(FO B)		Barkin Ladi (Sector 4)		Bassa (Sector 3)		Bokkos (Sector 5)		Mangu (FOB)	
	Fre q	%	Fre q	%	Freq	%	Fre q	%	Fre q	%	Fre q	%	Fre q	%
Male	82	90.1	48	92.3	36	85.7	47	75.8	68	91.9	45	91.8	19	76.0
Female	9	9.9	4	7.7	6	14.3	15	24.2	6	8.1	4	8.2	6	24.0
Total	91	100.0	52	100.0	42	100.0	62	100.0	74	100.0	49	100.0	25	100.0
Marital Status	HQ OPSH		Wase(FO B)		Shendam(FO B)		Barkin Ladi (Sector 4)		Bassa (Sector 3)		Bokkos (Sector 5)		Mangu (FOB)	
	Fre q	%	Fre q	%	Freq	%	Fre q	%	Fre q	%	Fre q	%	Fre q	%
Married	62	68.1	31	59.6	20	47.6	34	54.8	40	54.1	28	57.1	17	68.0
Single	12	13.2	12	23.1	13	31.0	9	14.5	20	27.0	13	26.5	3	12.0
Others	17	18.7	9	17.3	9	21.4	19	30.6	14	18.9	8	16.3	5	20.0
Total	91	100.0	52	100.0	42	100.0	62	100.0	74	100.0	49	100.0	25	100.0
Academic Qualification	HQ OPSH		Wase(FO B)		Shendam(FO B)		Barkin Ladi (Sector 4)		Bassa (Sector 3)		Bokkos (Sector 5)		Mangu (FOB)	
	Fre q	%	Fre q	%	Freq	%	Fre q	%	Fre q	%	Fre q	%	Fre q	%
PhD	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
MSc	4	4.4	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1.4	-	-	-	-

PGD	26	28.6	8	15.4	-	-	3	4.8	2	2.7	3	6.1	1	4.0
BSc	26	28.6	14	26.9	5	11.9	12	19.4	14	18.9	4	8.2	7	28.0
HND	15	16.5	11	21.2	13	31.0	15	24.2	12	16.2	10	20.4	10	40.0
OND	12	13.2	10	19.2	13	31.0	16	25.8	23	31.1	11	22.4	3	12.0
GCE	8	8.8	9	17.3	11	26.2	16	25.8	22	29.7	21	42.9	4	16.0
FSLC	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Nil	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total	91	100.0	52	100.0	42	100.0	62	100.0	74	100.0	49	100.0	25	100.0
Geopolitical Zone of Origin	HQ OPHS		Wase(FOB)		Shendam(FOB)		Barkin Ladi (Sector 4)		Bassa (Sector 3)		Bokkos (Sector 5)		Mangu (FOB)	
	Fre q	%	Fre q	%	Fre q	%	Fre q	%	Fre q	%	Fre q	%	Fre q	%
NE	8	8.8	7	13.5	3	7.1	2	3.2	10	13.5	8	16.3	4	16.0
NW	19	20.9	12	23.1	5	11.9	17	27.4	20	27.0	16	32.7	4	16.0
NC	31	34.1	10	19.2	9	21.4	24	38.7	18	24.3	12	24.5	8	32.0
SE	13	14.3	6	11.5	6	14.3	6	9.7	11	14.9	5	10.2	3	12.0
SW	15	16.5	11	21.2	14	33.3	9	14.5	9	12.2	1	2.0	2	8.0
SS	5	5.5	6	11.5	5	11.9	4	6.5	6	8.1	7	14.3	4	16.0
Total	91	100.0	52	100.0	42	100.0	62	100.0	74	100.0	49	100.0	25	100.0

Sources: Author's Field Survey 2021

Assessing the Nature of the Nigerian Military OPHS Operation in Internal Security Management in Plateau State.

The current study assessed the nature of the Nigerian military OPHS operation in internal security management in plateau state. The following statements as shown on table 1.5 was used to achieve this objective.

Contemporary Security threats are waxing stronger by the day in Plateau State														
Response	HQ OPHS		Wase (FOB)		Shendam (FOB)		Barkin Ladi (Sector 4)		Bassa (Sector 3)		Bokkos (Sector 5)		Mangu (FOB)	
	Fre q	%	Fre q	%	Fre q	%	Fre q	%	Fre q	%	Fre q	%	Fre q	%
Strongly Agreed	62	68.1	36	69.2	31	73.8	43	69.4	45	60.8	31	63.3	17	68.0
Agreed	24	26.4	9	17.3	5	11.9	13	21.0	26	35.1	14	28.6	4	16.0

										1		6		0
Strongly Disagreed	1	1.1	1	1.9	3	7.1	5	8.1	3	4.1	2	4.1	1	4.0
Disagreed	4	4.4	6	11.5	3	7.1	1	1.6	-	-	-	-	2	8.0
Undecided	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	4.1	1	4.0
Total	91	100.0	52	100.0	42	100.0	62	100.0	74	100	49	100	25	100

Nigerian military OPSH is responsive to the contemporary security threats in Plateau state.

Response	HQ OPSH		Wase (FOB)		Shendam (FOB)		Barkin Ladi (Sector 4)		Bassa (Sector 3)		Bokkos (Sector 5)		Mangu (FOB)	
	Freq	%	Freq	%	Freq	%	Freq	%	Freq	%	Freq	%	Freq	%
Strongly Agreed	71	78.0	42	80.8	34	81.0	42	67.7	54	73.0	33	67.3	18	72.0
Agreed	17	18.7	9	17.3	4	9.5	15	24.2	13	17.6	9	18.4	5	20.0
Strongly Disagreed	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	3.2	3	4.1	5	10.2	-	-
Disagreed	3	3.3	1	1.9	2	4.8	3	4.8	3	4.1	-	-	2	8.0
Undecided	-	-	-	-	2	4.8	-	-	1	1.4	2	4.1	-	-
Total	91	100.0	52	100.0	42	100.0	62	100.0	74	100	49	100	25	100

There is adequate coordination between the Nigerian military OPSH and other security agencies in internal security management.

Response	HQ OPSH		Wase (FOB)		Shendam (FOB)		Barkin Ladi (Sector 4)		Bassa (Sector 3)		Bokkos (Sector 5)		Mangu (FOB)	
	Freq	%	Freq	%	Freq	%	Freq	%	Freq	%	Freq	%	Freq	%
Strongly Agreed	44	48.4	28	53.8	26	61.9	40	64.5	45	60.8	39	79.6	18	72.0
Agreed	42	46.2	22	42.3	14	33.3	16	25.8	26	35.1	5	10.2	6	24.0
Strongly Disagreed	-	-	-	-	1	2.4	-	-	1	1.4	-	-	-	-
Disagreed	4	4.4	2	3.8	1	2.4	5	8.1	1	1.4	3	6.1	1	4.0
Undecided	1	1.1	-	-	-	-	1	1.6	1	1.4	2	4.1	-	-

Total	91	100.0	52	100.0	42	100.0	62	100.0	74	100.0	49	100.0	25	100.0
Nigerian military OPSH is not well equipped to tackle the security threats in Plateau state.														
Response	HQ OPSH		Wase (FOB)		Shendam (FOB)		Barkin Ladi (Sector 4)		Bassa (Sector 3)		Bokkos (Sector 5)		Mangu (FOB)	
	Fre q	%	Fre q	%	Fre q	%	Fre q	%	Fre q	%	Fre q	%	Fre q	%
Strongly Agreed	13	14.3	8	15.4	3	7.1	4	6.5	30	40.5	7	14.3	5	20.0
Agreed	29	31.9	16	30.8	8	19.0	9	14.5	29	39.2	9	18.4	6	24.0
Strongly Disagreed	28	30.8	11	21.2	16	38.1	23	37.1	12	16.2	16	32.7	7	28.0
Disagreed	21	23.1	17	32.7	15	35.7	26	41.9	3	4.1	16	32.7	7	28.0
Undecided	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	2.0	-	-
Total	91	100.0	52	100.0	42	100.0	62	100.0	74	100.0	49	100.0	25	100.0
There are challenges faced by the Nigerian military OPSH in the internal security management in the state.														
Response	HQ OPSH		Wase (FOB)		Shendam (FOB)		Barkin Ladi (Sector 4)		Bassa (Sector 3)		Bokkos (Sector 5)		Mangu (FOB)	
	Fre q	%	Fre q	%	Fre q	%	Fre q	%	Fre q	%	Fre q	%	Fre q	%
Strongly Agreed	34	37.4	19	36.5	15	35.7	16	25.8	36	48.6	13	26.5	10	40.0
Agreed	54	59.3	24	46.2	22	52.4	28	45.2	23	31.1	19	38.8	7	28.0
Strongly Disagreed	2	2.2	1	1.9	-	-	4	6.5	7	9.5	9	18.4	1	4.0
Disagreed	1	1.1	6	11.5	5	11.9	9	14.5	7	9.5	4	8.2	6	24.0
Undecided	-	-	2	3.8	-	-	5	8.1	1	1.4	4	8.2	1	4.0
Total	91	100.0	52	100.0	42	100.0	62	100.0	74	100.0	49	100.0	25	100.0
The ability of the Nigerian military OPSH in resolving security issues in the state can be trusted														
Response	HQ OPSH		Wase (FOB)		Shendam (FOB)		Barkin Ladi (Sector 4)		Bassa (Sector 3)		Bokkos (Sector 5)		Mangu (FOB)	

	Fre q	%	Fre q	%	Fre q	%	Fre q	%	Fre q	%	Fre q	%	Fre q	%
Strongly Agreed	72	79.1	31	59.6	19	45.2	38	61.3	41	55.4	27	55.1	20	80.0
Agreed	18	19.8	17	32.7	23	54.8	20	32.3	29	39.2	18	36.7	4	16.0
Strongly Disagreed	1	1.1	-	-	-	-	1	1.6	-	-	-	-	-	-
Disagreed	-	-	2	3.8	-	-	1	1.6	-	-	3	6.1	-	-
Undecided	-	-	2	3.8	-	-	2	3.2	4	5.4	1	2.0	1	4.0
Total	91	100.0	52	100.0	42	100.0	62	100.0	74	100.0	49	100.0	25	100.0

Source: Author's Field Survey, 2021

Findings from the table revealed that the contemporary security threats such as banditry, kidnapping, communal clashes and so on are waxing stronger in the state. This finding was reinforced with a key informant interview with the Commandant OPSH in Barkin Ladi who stated that “the crisis in the Plateau has taken a new dimension due to the fact that there has been uncontrollable spread of weapons due to past conflict in the state and these has brought about the current security threats in the state such as banditry, kidnapping and other vices”. This finding also corroborated with the findings of other key informants in this study which include; OPSH Commandant Bokkos, OPSH Commandant Mangu, OPSH FOB Commander Shendam, Sector 3 Commandant Bassa, the Police commissioner and also the youth leader.

The table further revealed that that the Nigerian military OPSH is responsive to the contemporary security threats bedeviling the state. Also, the finding was reinforced with with a key informant interview with the youth leader in Mangu, who affirmed that “without the presence of the military in their community according to Him it would have been a “Ghost town”, he claimed that the military is highly responsive to the contemporary security threats in Plateau state”. Findings from the table also shows that the Nigerian military OPSH is observing the rules of engagement in its operation in Plateau state. Although findings from the key informant interviewed strongly disagreed with the statement. To buttress on this statement findings from the key informant interview with the DG PSPBA, He stated that “In Bassa for example both the Fulanis and the Iregwes are accusing the military of being complicit if not bias. The Iregwes are saying that OPSH is there to protect the Fulanis and fulanis are also accusing the OPSH as often not being responsive enough. Therefore, the communities do not really trust the security agencies because over and over they have failed them”.

Findings from the table further revealed that there is adequate coordination between the Nigerian military OPSH and other security agencies in internal security management. This finding was further backed up by a key informant interview with the commissioner of police who states that “Although in the past there was no synergy between the Nigerian Police Force and the Nigerian Military but issues between the two agencies has been resolved and there is maximum interaction between the Police and the Military in curbing the security threat bedeviling the state”. In the same vein the Coordinator of the Operation Rainbow

stated that “There is lack of synergy among the security agencies and that the military were not carrying other security agencies along in their operation. That this result to mutual suspicion which discouraged adequate intelligent sharing”.

Also, the table further shows that the respondents strongly disagreed with the statement that the Nigerian military OPSH is not well equipped to tackle the security threats in Plateau state.

The study further assessed the challenges faced by the Nigerian army OPSH in the internal security management in Plateau state. The table shows that there are numerous challenges faced by the Nigerian army OPSH. This finding was also reinforced with key informant interviews with the OPSH Commandant of Barkin ladi Col. Abdulsalam, He stated that “The major problem faced by the Military OPSH in the internal security management in the state has to do with the selfish interest of the community leaders and also most of these community leaders could barely tolerate one another. He also stated that there is lack of sincerity among the community leaders, due to the fact that if any of their kinsmen is found wanting for a crime they usually shield that person from the authority. Other problem mentioned were lack of manpower inadequate technology such as drones and logistics”.

Findings from the table also revealed that majority of the respondents agreed to the statement that the ability of the Nigerian military OPSH in resolving security issues in the State can be trusted. This was further investigated using a key informant interview method with some stakeholders such as the Commandant OPSH/GOC 3 who stated that “The OPSH has brought about considerable peace in the Plateau, he also reiterated that if the military is not present on ground one could only imagine the sought of mayhem that will befall the State and hence the OPSH is highly trusted in resolving the security issues in the State”. In the same vein the JNI Chairman Plateau state chapter also stated that “The OPSH is effective but the major challenge is lack of security coverage, as there are so many areas that are not covered by the Nigerian military OPSH”.

Conclusion

The end of the cold war heralded the shift from inter-state to intra-conflicts which have become so complex as a result of globalization and many other reasons. The Study assessed the involvement of Nigerian Military Operation Safe Haven in internal security management. The complex nature of contemporary security threats conducted in an asymmetric manner has prolong insecurity in Plateau state. The Study established that contemporary security threats manifest in diverse ways and are conducted by both state and non-state actors. The state actors could be collaborators, while the non-state actors present themselves in the form of militias, insurgents, terrorists, unknown gunmen, bandits, kidnappers amongst others. Accordingly, addressing such complex security threats require inputs from numerous actors and stakeholders. Thus, at the operational level the OPSH, the various stakeholders, the communities amongst others bring their expertise and intelligence sharing in solving complex security threats facing the State. The military is one of the most consistent sub-sector of the Nigeria federal structure which serve as the last line of defense as espoused by the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria as amended. Right from independence to the present period of democratic rebirth; the complex task of keeping Nigeria one, and of protecting the nation from external and internal aggression undoubtedly rest primarily on the Nigerian military. The military has become an integral part of the nation’s internal security structure given the magnitude of current security threats in the country. Therefore, the people and various stakeholders should assist the Nigerian military OPSH in the fight against the contemporary security threats bedeviling the Plateau state.

Recommendations

In the light of the problems associated to OPSH involvement in the internal security management in Plateau state. The Study proffer the following recommendations:

- The Nigerian military should be provided with logistics and modern equipment such as security vehicles, bikes, drones to tackle contemporary security threats.
- There should be re-orientation of the officers and men involved in internal security operations in the State and the locals as well for effective cooperation and coordination in internal security management.
- The military and personnel from other services should be made to undergo joint training before engaging in internal security operation in order to meet up with the challenges associated with joint operation in internal security management in the State.

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